Endpoint-transparent Multipath Transport with Software-defined Networks

Multipath forwarding consists of using multiple paths simultaneously to transport data over the network. While most such techniques require endpoint modifications, we investigate how multipath forwarding can be done inside the network, transparently to endpoint hosts. With such a network-centric approach, packet reordering becomes a critical issue as it may cause critical performance degradation. We present a Software Defined Network architecture which automatically sets up multipath forwarding, including solutions for reordering and performance improvement, both at the sending side through multipath scheduling algorithms, and the receiver side, by resequencing out-of-order packets in a dedicated in-network buffer. We implemented a prototype with commonly available technology and evaluated it in both emulated and real networks. Our results show consistent throughput improvements, thanks to the use of aggregated path capacity. We give comparisons to Multipath TCP, where we show our approach can achieve a similar performance while offering the advantage of endpoint transparency

Quantifying Security Risks in Cloud Infrastructures:A Data-driven Approach

Businesses increasingly outsource their ICT services to cloud environments, mostly driven by considerations about costs, processes and security. However concerns around cloud exposure against cyber-security attacks are also growing. This bring about the question if the cloud really makes us more secure, or if it merely changes the type of threats we are exposed to. This PhD project aims at addressing this question by focusing on cloud infrastructure security. Using Internet measurements, we will take a data-driven approach to identify vulnerabilities and single points of failure in cloud infrastructure. Based on our analysis, we will propose solutions to mitigate these vulnerabilities and enhance the overall security of cloud environments

The Rise of Certificate Transparency and Its Implications on the Internet Ecosystem

In this paper, we analyze the evolution of Certificate Transparency (CT) over time and explore the implications of exposing certificate DNS names from the perspective of security and privacy. We find that certificates in CT logs have seen exponential growth. Website support for CT has also constantly increased, with now 33% of established connections supporting CT. With the increasing deployment of CT, there are also concerns of information leakage due to all certificates being visible in CT logs. To understand this threat, we introduce a CT honeypot and show that data from CT logs is being used to identify targets for scanning campaigns only minutes after certificate issuance. We present and evaluate a methodology to learn and validate new subdomains from the vast number of domains extracted from CT logged certificates.Comment: To be published at ACM IMC 201

Packed to the Brim: Investigating the Impact of Highly Responsive Prefixes on Internet-wide Measurement Campaigns

Internet-wide scans are an important tool to evaluate the deployment of services. To enable large-scale application layer scans, a fast, stateless port scan (e.g., using ZMap) is often performed ahead of time to collect responsive targets. It is a common expectation that port scans on the entire IPv4 address space provide a relatively unbiased view as they cover the complete address space. Previous work, however, has found prefixes where all addresses share particular properties. In IPv6, aliased prefixes and fully responsive prefixes, i.e., prefixes where all addresses are responsive, are a well-known phenomenon. However, there is no such in-depth analysis for prefixes with these responsiveness patterns in IPv4. This paper delves into the underlying factors of this phenomenon in the context of IPv4 and evaluates port scans on a total of 161 ports (142 TCP & 19 UDP ports) from three different vantage points. To account for packet loss and other scanning artifacts, we propose the notion of a new category of prefixes, which we call highly responsive prefixes (HRPs). Our findings show that the share of HRPs can make up 70 % of responsive addresses on selected ports. Regarding specific ports, we observe that CDNs contribute to the largest fraction of HRPs on TCP/80 and TCP/443, while TCP proxies emerge as the primary cause of HRPs on other ports. Our analysis also reveals that application layer handshakes to targets outside HRPs are, depending on the chosen service, up to three times more likely to be successful compared to handshakes with targets located in HRPs. To improve future scanning campaigns conducted by the research community, we make our study's data publicly available and provide a tool for detecting HRPs. Furthermore, we propose an approach for a more efficient, ethical, and sustainable application layer target selection